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Abstract 
This paper models the college admission process as a signaling game between the admissions office and a pool of 
heterogeneous applicants characterized by academic abilities and demonstrated interest. In the screening and selection 
process, applicants attempt to signal their private information through their performance on a standardized test (for 
academic abilities) and interview (for demonstrated interest).  We show, under general conditions, that a separating 
equilibrium exists in which it is incentive-compatible for applicants to reveal their characteristics truthfully, and thus the 
admissions office does not fall victim to the problem of information asymmetry. Furthermore, we delineate how this 
equilibrium can be induced by setting appropriate “scoring” thresholds associated with standardized tests and 
interviews.  
Keywords: asymmetry of information, college admission, signaling game, separating equilibrium 
1. Introduction  
In regard to the distribution of scholarship awards, it is a common strategy for university admissions offices to first 
stratify the prospective students into categories based on a selected set of metrics (such as high or low academic ability, 
initiative, etc.), then allocate the awards among the groups in a hierarchical manner. While this is an intuitive and 
widely used strategy, it has some basic complications which stem from the asymmetry of information: that is, the 
admissions office’s lack of an exact knowledge of the students’ caliber. Consequently, applicants have the incentive to 
imitate the behavior of other applicants who are more suited to receive larger scholarship awards. An example of such 
imitation would be lower-level students taking on substantial costs to score higher on standardized tests than they 
otherwise would have.  
The general problem of information asymmetry (and how to overcome it) has been widely studied in economics. In the 
labor market, employees often have better knowledge of their own ability than employers. According to Spence (1973), 
education credentials can be used as a signal to employers, indicating a higher level of ability that the potential 
employee may possess; thereby narrowing the information gap. Similar problems have been analyzed in the context of 
the insurance market (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), strategic disclosure of accounting information (Bushman & Smith, 
2001; Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003), corporate governance (Farber, 2005), and many others. To the best of our knowledge, 
the information asymmetry between the admissions office and college applicants has not been studied in a formal 
economic model when the former is distributing a scholarship.  
When the problem of information asymmetry goes unaddressed admissions offices get tricked into inefficiently 
allocating their scholarship awards. This leads to several unwanted effects, including the “crowding-out” of higher-level 
students and the overspending on students of lower caliber. According to Bound, Hershbein, and Long (2009), students 
have increasingly seen an incentive to amplify competitive behavior, particularly when it comes to standardized testing. 
There has also been an increase in the percentage of students seeking formal help in standardized test preparation and 
that access to this type of assistance has become more available, particularly for students of high-income families.  
All of this seemingly suggests the obvious: in general, imitative behavior is a prevalent phenomenon in the college 
admissions process and increasingly so. But what is even more disturbing is that Bound et al. (2009) had not found any 
evidence that an intensification of test-taking and test-prep culture has led to a general increase in academic ability. This 
suggests that imitative behavior also imposes an economic cost on applicants and hence gives more reason for the 
admissions office to combat it.  
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We consider the strategic interaction between the admissions office and a pool of applicants with incomplete 
information: only applicants themselves know their academic ability and interest in the school. The admissions office 
uses standard test score and an interview to screen and select candidates for scholarship. The contribution of this paper 
is to develop an incentive-compatible mechanism that prompts students to truthfully reveal their private information. 
Built on the seminal work of Spence (1973), we rigorously derive conditions that induce a separating equilibrium in 
which applicants of different types send different signals to the admissions office. We will also use our analysis to then 
make recommendations to admissions offices regarding admissions strategy.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the model in a general set up. Section 3 solves for the 
equilibrium. Section 4 provides an illustration based on a convenient cost function. Section 5 discusses comparative 
statics. Section 6 discusses implementation of the model. Section 7 concludes.  
2. The Model 
We seek to model the strategic interaction of two players: a representative college applicant and the university’s 
admissions office. As yield becomes a growingly important concern for universities (Clinedinst, 2019), the admissions 
office uses metrics like the level of contacts to identify students who are more likely to accept their offers (Deardon, Li, 
Meyerhoefer & Yang 2017). To reflect this, admission and scholarship decisions in our model depend not only on 
applicants’ academic ability but also their demonstrated interests. To be specific, the applicant (which we will also refer 
to as P1) is characterized by a vector (𝜃𝐴,  𝜃𝐷) representing his/her academic ability and demonstrated interest. Each 
trait can be characterized by “high” or “low.” Hence, as displayed in Table 1 below, the pool of applicants consists of 
four types,  
Table 1. Types of students (P1). 
Types of Students (P1) High Ability Low Ability 
High Demonstrated interest Type 1: (  
 ,    
 ) Type 2: (  
 ,    
 ) 
Low Demonstrated interest  Type 3: (  
 ,    
 ) Type 4: (  
 ,    
 ) 
 
The admissions office (which we also refer to as P2) suffers from the problem of asymmetric information. That is, P1 
possesses a certain amount of private information – namely, what type of student they are (low ability/high ability, low 
demonstrated interest/high demonstrated interest, etc.). This information is unknown to P2 and can lead to the 
inefficient allocation of admission and scholarship awards.  
A way P2 can gain access to this information is by screening P1 for their type. In our model, P2 has decided to use a 
standardized test and an interview as screening devices to probe P1’s level of academic ability and demonstrated 
interest, respectively. The timing of this game is described below in Figure 1.    
 
Figure 1. The timing of the admissions game 
 
Nature draws a “type” for P1. Based on the type information, P1 participates in the standard test and interview, with the 
response recorded by a vector (𝜆, 𝜇)  where  𝜆 ∈ (𝜆 , 𝜆)   represents the score of the standard test and 𝜇 ∈
(𝜇 , 𝜇) represents the performance in the interview. Based on the scores (𝜆, 𝜇), the admission office will decide to either 
“admit” or “reject” the applicant. If admitted, the admissions office can distribute a scholarship S to P1. Based on the 
Nature seperates the students into four types.  
STAGE 1: P1 participates in the standardized 
test and interview and obtain a score in each.  
STAGE 2: P2 decides which scholarship award to 
offer each student based on standardized test score 
and interview performance, as meausred by (λ, µ).  
STAGE 3: P1 chooses to accept or decline the 
award. 
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scholarship decision, P1 decides to accept or reject the offer vis-à-vis an alternative scholarship offer 𝜔𝑗 from other 
competitor schools, where j denotes student type. Intuitively the admissions office wants to attract high-type students 
with a more generous scholarship. 
We assume P1 will choose (𝜆, 𝜇) to maximize the following utility function, 
𝑈𝑗
1(𝜆, 𝜇) =  max *𝜋𝑗 + 𝑆 − 𝑐𝐸(𝜆, 𝜃
𝐴) − 𝑐𝐼(𝜇, 𝜃
𝐷), 𝜔𝑗+   
where 𝜋𝑗 is the intrinsic value of attending the university for type j students, S is the amount of the scholarship 
received, and 𝑐𝐸  (𝑐𝐼) is the irretrievable cost of preparing for the exam (interview). To be specific, we assume 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝜋𝐻 > 0, for 𝑗 = 1,2 (i.e., Type 1 and 2 students). That is, students with high demonstrated interest received a 
fixed positive utility 𝜋𝐻 from enrolling.  In contrast, students with low demonstrated interest (i.e., Type 3 and 4) find 
no intrinsic value in attending the university: 𝜋𝑗 = 0, 𝑗 = 3,4.  In addition, we assume the alternative offers satisfiy the 
following condition: 𝜔1 > 𝜔3 > 𝜔2 > 𝜔4 > 0. This assumption reflects the idea that academic ability is valued higher 
than demonstrated interest. 
The cost of preparing for the standardized test, 𝑐𝐸(𝜆, 𝜃
𝐴),  depends not only on the anticipated test score 𝜆 but also 
the level of the test taker’s academic ability 𝜃𝐴 ∈ *𝜃𝐻
𝐴,  𝜃𝐿
𝐴+. Additional regularity assumptions are made on these cost 
functions:  
1. Students receive zeros in exams and interviews when no effort is committed: 
𝑐𝐼(0, 𝜃
𝐷) =  𝑐𝐸(0, 𝜃
𝐴) = 0.  
2. Both cost functions are assumed to be differentiable, strictly increasing with respect to their first 
argument, and strictly decreasing with respect to their second argument: 𝑐1 > 0     𝑐2  0, where 
𝑐𝑘 denotes the partial derivative with respect to the k-th argument.  
3. There exists 𝑘, 𝑙 > 1 such that 𝑐𝐸(𝜆, 𝜃𝐿
𝐴) = 𝑘𝑐𝐸(𝜆, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) and 𝑐𝐼(𝜇, 𝜃𝐿
𝐷) = 𝑙𝑐𝐼(𝜇, 𝜃𝐻 
𝐷 ) for all 𝜆 and 𝜇.  
The second assumption makes it so that obtaining a higher score incurs a larger cost on the students (i.e., 𝑐1 > 0 ). In 
addition, students with low academic ability need to commit more effort to obtain the same score in the test relative to 
high ability students (i.e., 𝑐2  0). The differential effort between the two types, as described in the third assumption, 
does not depend on the point scale. This third assumption can be relaxed at the expense of a more complex proof.  
Recall that the objective of the admissions office is to make the students truthfully reveal their type. As will be 
established formally in the next section, the admissions office can use two different classes of scholarship, 𝑆𝐻 >  𝑆𝐿 >
0, to achieve this objective.  
3. Equilibrium 
The structure of the cost functions implies that low type students need to spend greater efforts to achieve the same score 
compared to the high type. As such, the high types are more likely to “signal” their credentials by achieving a certain 
score on the exam/interview, which the low type may not find it worthy to do so. It is common for the admissions office 
to develop a “threshold belief”: that is, any 𝜆 ≥ 𝜆* makes P2 believe the student has high academic ability and any 
𝜇 ≥ 𝜇* makes P2 believe the student has high desire and readiness. 
It is important to note that P2’s belief only changes at the threshold. That is, any marginal improvement in score on 
either side of the threshold will only lead to incremental cost on the student with no marginal benefit. Consequently, a 
rational high type student will score exactly 𝜆* or 𝜇*, whereas the low types find it reluctant to put forth any effort and 
hence achieve 0.  The mapping between observed score and implied type according to this “threshold-crossing” belief 
is reported below: in equilibrium, we expect the responses of the four types to be at the bottom-left corners of their 
respective quadrant.  
A natural question to ask is: is it possible for the admissions office to set up a scoring system (𝜆* and 𝜇*) and 
scholarship award 𝑆 such that it is incentive-compatible for the four types of applicants to respond exactly this way? 
As shown below, the admissions office needs to set up two distinct scholarship, with amounts 𝑆𝐻 >  𝑆𝐿 > 0. Once a set 
of restrictions are satisfied, a separating equilibrium can be induced in which each type of student takes a unique action 
according to the aforementioned belief. Consequently, their different responses to the standardized test and interview 
reveal their type. We first give a formal characterization of this equilibrium, and then discuss the restrictions needed to 
induce it.  




Figure 2. P2’s Belief 
 
Proposition 1 (Separating Equilibria): Once (𝝀*, 𝝁*) satisfy the five restrictions below, a separating equilibrium 
exists where Type 1 students respond with (𝝀*, 𝝁*) and accept 𝑆𝐻; Type 2 students choose (𝟎, 𝝁*) and accept 
scholarship award 0; Type 3 students choose (𝝀*, 𝟎) and accept 𝑆𝐿; and Type 4 students choose (𝟎, 𝟎) and will be 
rejected. 
(See Appendix for the proof) 
The key takeaway of this equilibrium result is that the low-type P1 do not have an incentive to mimic the high type, so 
the combination of screening devices (i.e., exam + interview) unveils the private information of P1. In other words, the 
equilibrium causes P1 to truthfully reveal their types. Since ability is valued more than desire, the admissions office 
would only offer scholarship awards to those who succeed in the test to attract them. Furthermore, those of P1 with 
impressive interviews will receive a greater scholarship award for signaling the high desire to attend. We will go 
through the restrictions which induce the separating equilibrium below. 
Restriction 1: 𝒍𝒄(𝝁*,   
 ) > 𝑺 − 𝑺 > 𝒄(𝝁*,   
 ) 
That is, the difference between 𝑆𝐻 and 𝑆𝐿 must be exceeded by the cost of achieving 𝜇* for low-desire students and 
must exceed the cost of achieving 𝜇* for high-desire students. This restriction guarantees that Type 3 students will find 
(𝝀*, 𝝁*) too costly to pursue. It will also guarantee that Type 1 students will accept 𝑆𝐻. 
Restriction 2:     + 𝑺 −  > 𝒄(𝝀*,   
 ) + 𝒄(𝝁*,   
 ) 
That is, that the utility associated with (𝝀*, 𝝁*) exceeds the alternative offer for Type 1 students. This guarantees that 
Type 1 students find the strategy associated with receiving 𝑆𝐻 to be more beneficial than their alternative offer.  
Restriction 3:    𝒄(𝝀*,   
 ) > 𝑺  
That is, the cost of achieving a score of 𝜆 on the exam must exceed the value of 𝑆𝐻 for low-ability students. This 
restriction guarantees that Type 2 students will truthfully reveal their type, and not try to mimic the behavior of Type 1 
students by signaling high academic ability.  
Restriction 4:    −  > 𝒄(𝝁*,   
 ) 
That is, the difference between the intrinsic utility Type 2 students receive from attending the school and their 
alternative offer must exceed the cost they incur for achieving an interview score of 𝜇. This restriction guarantees that 
Type 2 students will find it in their best demonstrated interest the school without a scholarship. 
Restriction 5: 𝑺 − 𝒄(𝝀*,   
 ) >  𝟑 
That is, the difference between 𝑆𝐿 and the cost of achieving an exam score 𝜆 for high ability students must exceed the 
alternative offer of Type 3 students. This restriction guarantees that the utility Type 3 students obtain from accepting 𝑆𝐿 
will be a more profitable alternative to 𝜔3. 
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To ensure the proposed separating is indeed implementable, we must ensure the five restrictions on 𝜆* and 𝜇* are not 
mutually exclusive. That is, some (𝜆*, 𝜇*) must satisfy all five restrictions simultaneously.  
Proposition 2 (Existence of Equilibria): For any cost functions discussed in Section II.3, there exists some (𝝀*, 𝝁*) 
that satisfy the five restrictions above.  
This proposition is proved in the Appendix, where we derive the bounds for (𝝀*, 𝝁*) from the restrictions and show the 
upper bounds exceed the lower bounds. Once the cost functions are known, the bounds can be solved in closed form. 
We provide an illustration below to show how it can be done.  
4. An Example 
In this section, we work out a simple example to serve as an antidote to the abstractness of the previous section and to 
solve for the bounds of 𝜆* and 𝜇*. These bounds are empirically relevant to the admissions office as they provide 
concrete guidance on how the evaluation standards on exams and interviews should be set.  
Define 𝑍𝐴 to be opportunity cost (measured as a dollar amount, say the forgone wages) on a student to improve his/her 
exam score by one point and 𝑍𝐷 to be the opportunity cost on a student to improve his/her interview score by one point. 
Since it is less costly for students with high academic ability to prepare for the test, we have 𝑍𝐿
𝐴 > 𝑍𝐻
𝐴. We define a 
student academic ability as the inverse of the opportunity cost: 𝜃𝐴 =
1
𝑍𝐴




𝐴.  In 
using parallel reasoning for the interview cost function, we define 𝜃𝐷 =
1
𝑍𝐷
. To ensure consistency with the notation in 


















𝐷 , 𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐿
𝐴) = 𝑘𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) and 𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐿
𝐷) = 𝑙𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐻 
𝐷 ) for all 𝜆 and 𝜇. 
We can now solve for the closed form of 𝜆* and 𝜇* by using our restrictions, which induce a separating equilibrium. 


















𝐴 > 𝑆𝐻 







𝐴 > 𝜔3 




𝐷 > 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 >
𝜇*
𝜃𝐻
𝐷 ⇒ 𝜇*𝑙 > 𝜃𝐻




⇒ 𝝁* >   
 (𝑺 − 𝑺 ) 
2. We revisit Restriction 2 upon finding other potential upper bounds for 𝜆* and 𝜇*. 






𝐴 > 𝑆𝐻 ⇒ 𝜆*k > 𝑆𝐻𝜃𝐻




⇒ 𝝀* > 𝑺   
  
4. 𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2 >
𝜇*
𝜃𝐻
𝐷 ⇒   




𝐴 > 𝜔3 ⇒   
 (𝑺 − 𝟑) > 𝝀* 
In revisiting Restriction 2, we determine if a tautology will be produced by substituting the upper bounds of 𝜆* and 𝜇* 
found in Restrictions 5 and 4, respectively. If we are able to show that a tautology exists in this case, we eliminate 
Restriction 2 from consideration as the upper constraint it will pose to 𝜆* and 𝜇* will exceed that of the alternatively 
presented upper constraints, rendering it unnecessary.  








𝐷 ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔1 > 𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3 + 𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2 ⇒ 𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔1 > 𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3 −𝜔2
⇒ 𝑺 −  >
 
𝒓
(𝑺 −  ) −    






> 1 . Therefore, our 𝜆*  and 𝜇*  are determined completely by 
constraints 1,3,4, and 5. Substituting 𝜃𝐴 =
1
𝑍𝐴
 and  𝜃𝐷 =
1
𝑍𝐷
, the admissible range of 𝜆* and 𝜇* can be succinctly 
presented as  
(𝑆𝐿−𝜔3)
𝑍𝐻
𝐴 > 𝜆* >
𝑆𝐻
𝑍𝐿
𝐴                                       (a) 
( 𝐻−𝜔 )
𝑍𝐻
𝐷 > 𝜇* >
(𝑆𝐻−𝑆𝐿)
𝑍𝐿
𝐷                                    (b)    
To gain additional insight, we can multiply (a) by 𝑍𝐿
𝐴 and we get 𝜆*𝑍𝐿
𝐴 > 𝑆𝐻. This implies that for students with low 
academic ability (Type 2, for example), the economic cost of obtaining the “passing score” on the exam must exceed the 
high scholarship reward. As such, such a constraint effectively forestalls them from mimicking the high ability students 
(Type 1). Similarly, in multiplying (a) by 𝑍𝐻
𝐴, we get 𝑆𝐿 − 𝜔3 > 𝜆*𝑍𝐻
𝐴. This ensures that the economic cost of 
preparing for and completing the test is low enough for Type 3 students (high ability and low desire and readiness) such 
that the net benefit of receiving 𝑆𝐿 still exceeds the alternative offer. We show the cost associated with the standardized 












Figure 3. λ graphed as a function of Z 
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Point A serves as a break-even point for Type 2 students, where the cost of obtaining the high scholarship equals the 
value of the high scholarship, leaving them indifferent to the imitation of Type 1 behavior at this value of 𝜆. Point B 
serves as a break-even point for Type 3 students, where the cost of obtaining the low scholarship, which is 𝜆𝑍𝐻
𝐴 + 𝜔3, 
equals the value of the low scholarship. At point B, Type 3 students find themselves indifferent to the imitation of Type 
4 behavior. Thus, 𝜆* excludes the 𝜆 values of points A and B but includes all of the values of 𝜆 in between. 
Turning to constraint (b), we first multiply 𝑍𝐿
𝐷 and get 𝜇*𝑍𝐿
𝐷 > 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿. This ensures that Type 3 students do not 
bother to mimic Type 1 students as the scholarship differential is no greater than the additional cost of preparing for the 
interview. Lastly, we multiply (b) by 𝑍𝐻
𝐷 and we get 𝜇*𝑍𝐻
𝐷   𝜋𝐻 − 𝜔2. For Type 2 students (high desire and readiness 
and low ability), it is still cost-effective for them to prepare for and pass the interview stage so they can attend the 
university and obtain 𝜋𝐻.  
We show the cost associated with the interview as a function of 𝜇 in the graphs below. We simultaneously represent the 
range of 𝜇*. Because it is not certain whether 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 is greater than, less than or equal to 𝜋𝐻 − 𝜔2, we provide a 
graph for each of the cases. 
 
Figure 4. μ graphed as a function of Z where 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 > 𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2. 
 
Figure 5. μ graphed as a function of Z where 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿  𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2. 




Figure 6. μ graphed as a function of Z where 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 = 𝜋𝐻 − 𝜔2. 
 
In each case, point C serves as a break-even point for Type 3 students, where the differential between the two 
scholarship awards is equal to the cost of passing the interview task, which leaves them indifferent to imitating Type 1 
students by achieving 𝜇*. Point D serves as a break-even point for Type 2 students, where the differential between the 
intrinsic value they receive from merely attending the school and their alternative offer is equal to the cost of achieving 
𝜇. At point D, Type 2 students find themselves indifferent to the imitation of Type 4 behavior. Thus, 𝜇* excludes the 𝜇 
values of points C and D but includes all of the values of 𝜇 in between. 
In summary, constraint (a) ensures that only Type 3 (and not Type 2) will make the effort in passing the exam and 
constraint (b) ensures that only Type 2 (and not Type 3) will make the effort in passing the interview. As a result, both 
types are incentivized to signal their ability/interests appropriately in the test/interview stage, respectively.  
5. Comparative Statics 
In our model, the range of 𝜆* and 𝜇* are endogenously determined by exogenous variables 𝑍, 𝑆, 𝜔, and 𝜋. Using 
our findings, we can answer several questions regarding comparative statics, the manners in which 𝜆* and 𝜇* are 
affected by changes in these exogenous variables.  
In the case of both 𝜆 and 𝜇, 𝑍𝐻 and 𝑍𝐿 affect the sizes of the sets 𝜆* and 𝜇*. Specifically, if the differential 
between 𝑍𝐻 and 𝑍𝐿 increases, then the sizes – that is, the ranges of scores - of 𝜆* and 𝜇* widen (for 𝜇*, this 
phenomenon occurs for all three cases covered in Figures 4-6). Thus, if the cost differential for completing each 
application task increases between the high and low type students, then the lower bounds for 𝜆* and 𝜇* decrease and 
the upper bounds increase and vice versa.  This relationship is due to the fact that in the functions 𝜆𝑍𝐴 and 𝜇𝑍𝐷, 𝑍 





𝐴 diverge more dramatically and the break-even points move away from each other, leaving us with a larger set 
for 𝜆* (this same phenomenon occurs for 𝜇*).  
In our analysis, we assume the value 
𝑆𝐻
𝑆𝐿
 to be a constant 𝑟, and in the name of consistency, we cannot consider a 
movement in one without simultaneously moving the other proportionately. In the case of 𝜆, an increase in one and a 
proportionate increase in the other will drive up both the lower and upper bounds of 𝜆*. It is unclear at this point how 
this change will affect the size of the set of 𝜆*. In the case of 𝜇, an increase in one and a proportionate increase in the 
other will move the lower bound of 𝜇* in the positive direction laterally. This makes the standards for passing the 
interview process more difficult for the student. In this case, we can also deduce that the range of 𝜇* will contract.  
Turning to 𝜔, when 𝜔2 increases the upper bound for 𝜇* decreases. This indicates that when the alternative offer for 
Type 2 students increases, fewer interview scores could be considered by the admissions office as the passing score. 
Alternatively, when 𝜔3 increases the upper bound for 𝜆* increases. That is, when the alternative offer for Type 3 
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students increases, higher scores for the standardized test could be considered by the admissions office as the passing 
score.  
Lastly, when 𝜋𝐻 increases the upper bound for 𝜇* increases. Thus, 𝜋𝐻 and the direction of change for the upper 
extremity for 𝜇* are positively related.  
6. Empirical Implementation/Implication 
In this section, we discuss to what extent the theoretical model is consistent with the current status of college admission 
in the U.S. as well as what policy implications can this theoretical framework offer.  
Admittedly, the most suitable way of validating the theoretical model is to collaborate with university admission office 
to conduct experiment. Given the amount of time and resource that such experiments can potentially take, we would 
leave them as future research work. Nevertheless, we would like to present some empirical evidence from other studies 
to support our model prediction.  
First of all, the results of this study confirmed research regarding high school GPA and other pre-college variables as a 
successful significant positive predictor for the admission outcome (Astin, 1997; Hoffman & Lowitzki, 2005; Schwartz 
& Washington, 2002; Ting, 1998; Wolfe & Johnson, 1995). After all, if applicants are incentivized to cram for 
standardized tests and interviews to game the admission system (Bound et al., 2009), the admission office ought to use 
pre-college variables to screen applicants. In a recent study, by analyzing data from 192 institutions, Sawyer (2013) 
suggests that high school GPA is more useful than admission test scores in situations involving low selectivity in 
admissions and minimal to average academic performance in college.  
Another important conclusion of the model is that scholarship awards can be used as effective means to increase 
enrollment rate. However, the admission criteria must be adjusted according to the scholarship amount to ensure the 
separating equilibrium outcome (i.e., as specified in equations (a)-(b)). The complexity of the proposed mechanism 
might, to some extent, explain the mixed empirical findings in regards to the enrollment effect on scholarship. In Bartik, 
Hershbein and Lachowska (2015), the authors estimate the effects on postsecondary education outcomes of the 
Kalamazoo Promise, a generous place-based college scholarship. Using difference-in-differences, the authors find the 
Promise significantly increases college enrollment. In contrast, Bozick, Gonzalez and Engberg (2015), using admission 
data from the Pittsburgh Promise scholarship program, showed that the scholarship had no direct effect on the overall 
rate of college enrollment.  
7. Conclusion  
We have employed our methodology and induced a response from P1 that corresponds to true type behavior. Recall that 
this was accomplished by applying the separating equilibrium, which is designed specifically to separate the students 
into their true types. The strategy we propose consists of manipulating the scoring thresholds for the exam and interview 
in such a fashion that meeting said thresholds becomes too costly for low-type students. 
We show in Section VI of this paper that there exist a set of both 𝜆 and 𝜇 that satisfy each of the restrictions for all 
𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐴) and 𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐷). Thus, in our game, it is always possible to induce the equilibrium. There are economic 
consequences for deviating from the equilibrium.  
1) Violating Restriction 1 would either provide an incentive for Type 3 students to mimic Type 1 
behavior, fail to provide enough of an incentive for Type 1 students to accept P2’s offer of 𝑆𝐻, or 
both. 
2) Violating Restriction 2 would fail to provide enough of an incentive for Type 1 students to engage in 
true Type 1 behavior. 
3) Violating Restriction 3 would fail to take away any incentive for Type 2 students to mimic Type 1 
behavior. 
4) Violating Restriction 4 would fail to provide enough of an incentive for Type 2 students to enroll 
without scholarship. 
5) Violating Restriction 5 would fail to provide enough of an incentive for Type 3 students to engage in 
true Type 3 behavior. 
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In this section, we will prove that Proposition 1 is the result of the game if all of the restrictions are assumed. Thus, we 
will show that the five restrictions cause each type to act according to the proposition. Proposition 2 argues the 
existence of 𝜆* and 𝜇* for any and all 𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐴) and 𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐷) and we show this as well. Note that 𝑐 is a cost 
function of the form 𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦) and is positively related with 𝑥. Thus, for any 𝑥1 > 𝑥2, 𝑐(𝑥1, 𝑦) > 𝑐(𝑥2, 𝑦).    
Recall: 
Proposition 1: Once (𝝀*, 𝝁*) satisfy the five restrictions below, a separating equilibrium exists where Type 1 students 
respond with (𝝀*, 𝝁*) and accept 𝑆𝐻; Type 2 students choose (𝟎, 𝝁*) and accept scholarship award 0; Type 3 
students choose (𝝀*, 𝟎) and accept 𝑆𝐿; and Type 4 students choose (𝟎, 𝟎) and will be rejected. 
Where the restrictions – numbered 1 through 5 – are: 
1. 𝑙𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 > 𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) 
2. 𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 −𝜔1 > 𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) + 𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) 
3. 𝑘𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝑆𝐻 
4. 𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2 > 𝑐(𝜇, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) 
5. 𝑆𝐿 − 𝑐(𝜆, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝜔3 
Proposition 1 claims that each type of student takes a unique strategy. It also claims that each type of student makes a 
unique decision about their scholarship offer. To prove that under these restrictions no student will find an incentive to 
mimic another types’ true behavior, we show that the utility they obtain from pursuing their true behavior, prescribed to 
them in Proposition 1, exceeds the utility they would obtain from such imitation. 
Consider Table 6, where 𝑈𝑗
𝑖 is the utility of signaling type 𝑖 for any student type 𝑗.  
Table 6. Utility from strategy. 
𝑈𝑗





















We must show that in assuming the above restrictions, for each 𝑗 𝑈𝑗
𝑖 where 𝑖 = 𝑗 exceeds every 𝑈𝑗
𝑖 where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
The utility of being rejected from the university is the student’s alternative offer. 
For Type 1 students, we show that: 
 Restriction 5 gives us 𝑆𝐿 > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) + 𝜔3 ⇒ 𝑆𝐿 > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) ⇒ 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 0 ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 −
𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) − 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻




 Restriction 1 gives us 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 > 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) ⇒ 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑆𝐿 ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) −
𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻




 Restriction 2 gives us 
𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 −𝜔1 > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) + 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) − 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝜔1 ⇒ 𝑈1
1 > 𝑈1
4. 
For Type 2 students, we show that: 
 Restriction 3 gives us 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝑆𝐻 ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻





 Restrictions 1 and 3 give us 𝑆𝐻 − (𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑆𝐿 and  𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝑆𝐻, ergo 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) −
(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑆𝐿 ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻




 Restriction 3 gives us 𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2 > 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) ⇒ 𝜋𝐻 − 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝜔2 ⇒ 𝑈2
2 > 𝑈2
4. 
For Type 3 students, we show that: 
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 Restriction 1 gives us 𝑙𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 ⇒ 𝑆𝐿 > 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑙𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) ⇒ 𝑆𝐿 − 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝑆𝐻 −
𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻




 Restriction 5 gives us 𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3 > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) ⇒ 𝑆𝐿 > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) ⇒ 𝑆𝐿 + 𝑙𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) ⇒
𝑆𝐿 − 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻




 Restriction 5 gives us 𝑆𝐿 − 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝜔3 ⇒ 𝑈3
3 > 𝑈3
4. 
For Type 4 students, we show that: 
 Restriction 3 gives us 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝑆𝐻 ⇒ 𝜔4 + 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) + 𝑙𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝑆𝐻 ⇒ 𝜔4 > 𝑆𝐻 −
𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻




 The statement 𝜔4 > −𝑙𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) true for any combination of 𝜔4, 𝑙, and 𝑐(𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) as all are greater 




 Restriction 3 gives us 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝑆𝐿 ⇒ 𝜔4 + 𝑘𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻





We have thus shown that for each 𝑗 𝑈𝑗
𝑖 where 𝑖 = 𝑗 exceeds every 𝑈𝑗
𝑖 where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Therefore, Type 1 students 
respond with (𝝀*, 𝝁*) and accept 𝑆𝐻 ; Type 2 students choose (𝟎, 𝝁*) and accept scholarship award 0; Type 3 
students choose (𝝀*, 𝟎) and accept 𝑆𝐿; and Type 4 students choose (𝟎, 𝟎) and will be rejected. ∎ 
Recall: 
Proposition 2: For any cost functions discussed in Section II.3, there exists some (𝝀*, 𝝁*) that satisfy the five 
restrictions above.  
Using the restrictions, we can invert the cost functions to give us potential upper bounds and lower bounds of 𝜆* and 
𝜇*. In inverting Restrictions 1, 3, 4, and 5, we obtain the five following constraints: 




𝐷), a potential lower bound for 𝜇*. 
ii. 𝑐−1(𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝜇*, a potential upper bound for 𝜇*. 
iii. 𝜆* > 𝑐−1 (𝑆𝐻
𝑘
, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴), a potential lower bound for 𝜆*. 
iv. 𝑐−1(𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) > 𝜇*, a potential upper bound for 𝜇*. 
v. 𝑐−1(𝑆𝐿 − 𝜔3, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) > 𝜆*, a potential upper bound for 𝜆*. 
 
In substituting the potential upper bounds for 𝜆* and 𝜇* for Restriction 2, we find  
𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔1 > 𝑐(𝑐
−1(𝑆𝐿 − 𝜔3, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴), 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) + 𝑐(𝑐−1(𝜋2 −𝜔2, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷), 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) ⇒ 
𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 −𝜔1 > 𝑆𝐿 − 𝜔3 + 𝜋2 − 𝜔2 ⇒ 
𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔1 > 𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3 −𝜔2 ⇒ 
𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔1 >
1
𝑟
(𝑆𝐻 −𝜔1) − 𝜔2 
and 
𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 −𝜔1 > 𝑐(𝑐
−1(𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3, 𝜃𝐻
𝐴), 𝜃𝐻
𝐴) + 𝑐(𝑐−1(𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿, 𝜃𝐻
𝐷), 𝜃𝐻
𝐷) ⇒ 
𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔1 > 𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3 + 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 ⇒ 
𝜋𝐻 + 𝑆𝐻 −𝜔1 > 𝑆𝐻 − 𝜔3 ⇒ 
𝜋𝐻 − 𝜔1 > −𝜔3 ⇒ 
𝜋𝐻 +𝜔3 > 𝜔1 ⇒ 




𝑟(𝜋𝐻 −𝜔1) > −𝜔1 ⇒ 











The first result is a tautology. The second result shows that there is no contradiction as 𝑟 is assumed to be greater than 
1. This tells us that the maximum values of 𝜆* and 𝜇* provided by Constraints ii, iv, and v satisfy Restriction 2. Thus, 
Restriction 2 does not provide a minimum upper bound on either 𝜆* or 𝜇*. 
To prove the existence of 𝜆* and 𝜇*, we show that the upper bounds of each exceed the lower bounds of each.  
Restriction 5 gives us 𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3 > 𝑐(𝜆*, 𝜃𝐻








𝑐−1(𝑆𝐿 − 𝜔3, 𝜃𝐻




𝐴) ⇒ 𝑐−1(𝑆𝐿 −𝜔3, 𝜃𝐻




𝐴). Thus, 𝝀* exists. 
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿 >
𝑆𝐻−𝑆𝐿
𝑙
  is true as 𝑙 > 1. Thus, 𝑐−1(𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿, 𝜃𝐻




𝐷) ⇒ 𝑐−1(𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿, 𝜃𝐻





𝐷). Restriction 4 gives us 𝜋𝐻 −𝜔2 > (𝜇*, 𝜃𝐻








⇒ 𝑐−1(𝜋𝐻 − 𝜔2, 𝜃𝐻




𝐷) ⇒ 𝑐−1(𝜋𝐻 − 𝜔2, 𝜃𝐻
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